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Abstract
This paper analyses successive markets where the intra-market linkage
depends on the technology used to produce the ￿nal output. We investi-
gate entry of new ￿rms, when entry obtains by expanding the economy,
as well as collusive agreements between ￿rms. We highlight the di⁄eren-
tiated e⁄ects of entry corresponding to a constant or decreasing returns
technology. In particular, we show that, under decreasing returns, free
entry in both markets does not entail the usual tendency for the input
price to adjust to its marginal cost while it does under constant returns.
Then, we analyse collusive agreements by stressing the role of upstream
linkage on the pro￿tability of horizontal mergers ￿ la Salant, Switzer and
Reynolds.
Keywords: Oligopoly, entry, horizontal collusion, foreclosure
JEL classi￿cation: D43, L1, L22, L42
1 Introduction
The analysis of collusion between downstream and upstream ￿rms operating in
successive markets traditionally relies on Cournot competition. In these mar-
kets, ￿rms select non cooperatively the quantities of output of the good they
produce, the output of the upstream ￿rms serving as input in the production of
the output in the downstream market. Collusion is represented as an agreement
through which the insiders of the collusive agreement act in unison, reducing
thereby the total number of decision units operating in the downstream and up-
stream markets and, thus, the corresponding number of oligopolists in each of
them. Collusive outcomes are the Cournot equilibria corresponding to these re-
duced numbers of oligopolists, which are then compared with those arising when
downstream and upstream ￿rms act independently from each other in their re-
spective markets. The link between the two markets follows from the fact that
the downstream ￿rms￿unit cost appears as the unit revenue for the upstream
ones : the price paid for a unit of input for the ￿rms in the former constitutes
the unit receipt for the ￿rms in the latter. The papers by Salinger (1988), or
1Gaudet and Van Long (1996) are typical examples where this framework is used.
In particular, both these papers adopt the assumption that downstream ￿rms
are price-takers when buying the input while upstream ￿rms behave as Cournot
competitors on the resulting demand function. However, both these papers use
hidden assumptions when describing in the model how the input price depends
on the decisions of the ￿rms in both markets. For instance, the paper by Salinger
assumes (without being fully explicit about this assumption) that downstream
￿rms have a constant returns technology. Similarly, Gaudet and Van Long sup-
pose an even stronger technical relationship between the input and output: they
simply assume that one unit of input is transformed homogeneously in one unit
of output !
In order to better understand how the e⁄ects of mergers and entry in suc-
cessive markets depend on technology, we ￿rst propose a model which makes
explicit how the downstream and upstream markets are linked to each other via
the technology used by the downstream ￿rms to transform the input into the
output. For this purpose, we de￿ne two markets as technology- linked whenever
the good produced and exchanged in one of them is transformed, via some tech-
nology, into another good, and then exchanged by the ￿rms operating in the
other market. Then, we consider two examples of technology-linked markets.
The ￿rst corresponds to a decreasing returns technology while the other uses
a constant returns technology, as in the case of Salinger and Gaudet and Van
Long. In the framework of these examples, we highlight some features accompa-
nying the entry of new ￿rms. These features di⁄er from one technology to the
other, underlying the crucial role played by the technology which links the up-
stream and downstream markets. In particular, we show that, under decreasing
returns, free entry in both markets does not entail the usual tendency for the
input price to adjust to its marginal cost while it does under constant returns.
Also we show that some merger may result pro￿table under one technology
but brings losses with the other. We stress also the di⁄erences obtained in our
framework with those appearing in the papers referred to above.
Another outcome of our approach consists in studying the role played by the
existence of an upstream market on collusive agreements among ￿rms in the
downstream one. The analysis of horizontal mergers has often been performed
assuming that ￿rms face an exogenous cost function for producing the output,
as in Salant, Schwitzer and Reynolds (1983). Here we make this cost function
endogenous, taking into account the technology used by the downstream ￿rms
when producing the output. It turns out that the consequences of collusive
agreements can be very di⁄erent.
Finally, our framework can also be used to analyze other economic issues like
product di⁄erentiation as in Belle￿ amme and Toulemonde (2003), or mergers￿
stability, as in d￿ Aspremont et al. (1983). Furthermore, it can be used as well
to analyse mergers in the spirit of Neumann, Fell and Reichel (2005).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present
the model, assuming a given number of ￿rms in the upstream and downstream
markets. In Section 3, we consider two examples of technology-linked markets
corresponding to two di⁄erent technologies, and highlight the di⁄erentiated ef-
2fects resulting from entry. Section 4 provides the analysis of collusion; further-
more, we revisit at the light of our analysis a paper by Salant, Switzer and
Reynolds (1983) devoted to horizontal integration. Section ￿ve concludes.
2 The model
We consider two technology-linked markets, the downstream and upstream mar-
kets, with n downstream ￿rms i;i = 1;:::n; in the ￿rst producing the output,
and m upstream ￿rms j, j = 1;:::m; in the second, producing and selling the in-
put. The n downstream ￿rms face a demand function ￿(Q) in the downstream
market, with Q denoting aggregate output: Firm i owns technology fi(z) to
produce the output, namely
qi = fi(z);
with z denoting the quantity of the sole input used in the production process
and bought by ￿rm i in the upstream market. The m upstream ￿rms each
produce the input z at a total cost Cj(z);j = 1;::;m:We assume that this
situation gives rise to two games. The players in the ￿rst game, the downstream
game, are the n downstream ￿rms with output strategies qi, while the players
in the second, the upstream game, are the upstream ￿rms with input strategies
sj: The two markets are linked to each other as follows. In the downstream
game, ￿rms select strategically their output levels qi which determines their
individual demand zi(p) of input via both the production function fi; namely
zi = f
￿1
i (qi); and the input price p: Consequently, the downstream ￿rms while
behaving strategically in the output market, are assumed to be price takers in
the input market. Faced with the input demand schedule ￿n
i=1zi(p) resulting
from aggregating individual demands, ￿rms in the upstream game select non
cooperatively the quantities of input sj they o⁄er for sale; the input market
price at which upstream ￿rms evaluate their pro￿ts is assumed to clear the




Given an input price p; the payo⁄ in the downstream game for the ith ￿rm
at the vector of strategies (qi;q￿i) obtains as
￿i(qi;q￿i;p) = ￿(qi + ￿k6=iqk)qi ￿ pf
￿1
i (qi):
Expressed in terms of input, this payo⁄ rewrites as
￿i(zi;z￿i;p) = ￿ (fi(zi) + ￿k6=ifk(zk))fi(zi) ￿ pzi:
Given these payo⁄s and a price p in the input market, the best reply, zi(z￿i;p)
















for all i;i = 1;::;n:
In the upstream game, ￿rms select their selling strategies sj;j = 1;::;m:
Assuming a Nash equilibrium in the downstream game, they face a total demand
￿n
i=1z￿





i (p) = ￿m
k=1sk:




whenever it is de￿ned for all admissible values of p. Denote by (s￿
1;:::;s￿
m) a Nash
equilibrium in the upstream game (whenever it exists). We de￿ne an industry




m) and an input price
p￿ such that (i) (q￿
1;:::;q￿
n) is a Nash equilibrium in the downstream game (ii)
(s￿
1;:::;s￿
m) is a Nash equilibrium in the upstream one, and (iii) p￿ = p(￿m
k=1s￿
k):
An industry equilibrium is a situation in which both the downstream and up-
stream markets exhibit Cournot equilibria, and where the quantity of input
demanded at equilibrium in the ￿rst market exactly balances the quantity sup-
plied in the second.
We have de￿ned an industry equilibrium for the case of two technology-
linked markets with the link reducing to a technology which uses a single input.
Nonetheless, there is no reason to restrict this concept by putting constraints
on the number of markets linked and the number of inputs through which these
markets are linked. Concerning the number of markets linked by technology, we
could easily set up a model with a chain of markets 1;2;::;r;r + 1;:::M; where
commodity r + 1 is produced and exchanged in market r + 1; and serves as
an input for the ￿rms operating in market r : then, markets are two-by-two
technology-linked. Concerning the number of inputs, it would not be di¢ cult to
extend our analysis to a technology embodying two factors, one of them being
viewed as a ￿xed input. Also more elaborate technology-linked markets￿net-
works could be investigated, which do not reduce to two-by-two linked markets,
but also link one, or several, market(s) to several others, corresponding to the
various inputs used in the production of the good exchanged in the former while
bought in the latter.
3 Exploring industry equilibria: entry
It is di¢ cult to analyze industry equilibria at the full level of generality under-
lying the above model. This is why we try to get some insight into the relation-
ship between technology and competition observed at an industry equilibrium
4by looking at two signi￿cant examples. The ￿rst corresponds to a situation
in which downstream ￿rms are endowed with a decreasing returns technology
while the second is characterized by constant returns. Furthermore, we assume
in both examples a linear demand function in the downstream market, as in
Salinger (1988) and Gaudet and Van Long (1996). We also assume that ￿rms
operating in the upstream (resp. downstream) market are all identical. Entry
and competition are analyzed through the asymptotic properties of the indus-
try equilibria when the number of ￿rms in the technologically-linked markets is
increased by expanding the economy, as in Debreu and Scarf (1963). The two
examples are now considered successively and their conclusions are compared.
3.1 Decreasing Returns
The n downstream ￿rms are assumed to face a linear demand ￿(Q) = 1 ￿ Q in
the downstream market: They share the same technology f(z) to produce the
output, namely
q = f(z) = z
1
2:
The m upstream ￿rms each produce the input z at the same linear total cost
Cj(sj) = ￿sj; j = 1;::;m: As in the general formulation above, we assume that
this situation gives rise to two games. The players in the ￿rst game are the n
downstream ￿rms with output strategies qi, while the players in the second are
the m upstream ￿rms with input strategies sj:
The pro￿ts of the ith downstream ￿rm at the vector of strategies (qi;q￿i)
obtains as
￿i(qi;q￿i) = (1 ￿ qi ￿ ￿k6=iqk)qi ￿ pq2
i :
As a result of the strategic choice qi; each ￿rm i sends the input quantity signal
zi(p) = q2
i to the upstream market. When aggregating these signals, we get
the demand function of input over which the upstream ￿rms select their sell-
ing strategies sj: The jth upstream ￿rm￿ s pro￿t ￿j at the vector of strategies
(sj;s￿j) writes as
￿j(sj;s￿j) = p(sj;s￿j)sj ￿ ￿sj; (1)
with p(sj;s￿j) such that ￿m
k=1sk = ￿n
k=1zi(p).
Given a price p in the input market, the best reply of downstream ￿rm i in





Clearly, these best replies depend on the upstream market price p and we may
compute the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the above game, contingent on the
price p: De￿ning qi = q for i = 1:::n; re-expressing equation (2) and solving it




(n + 2p + 1)
(3)
5so that we obtain
z￿
i (p) = z￿(p) =
1
(n + 2p + 1)
2; i = 1:::n: (4)




i (p) of input equal to nz￿(p):
At a given an n-tuple (s1;:::;sj;::sm) of input strategies chosen by the upstream
￿rms in the upstream game, the input price clearing the upstream market must
satisfy
n
(n + 2p + 1)
2 = ￿m
k=1sk











Substituting (5) into (1), the payo⁄ function ￿j(sj;s￿j) of the upstream










Notice that the pro￿t function ￿j(sj;s￿j) is concave in sj;j = 1;:::m; so that
we can use the ￿rst order necessary and su¢ cient conditions to characterize an





4m3 (2￿ + 1 + n)
2:
Hence the pro￿t ￿j(m;n) of an upstream ￿rm at the symmetric equilibrium of




Finally, the equilibrium price p￿(m;n) in the input market obtains as
p￿(m;n) =
n + 1 + 4m￿
2(2m ￿ 1)
:
Consequently, substituting this equilibrium price into the equilibrium quantities




4m2 (2￿ + n + 1)
2
so that, from (3), we obtain
6q￿
i (m;n) = q￿(m;n) =
2m ￿ 1
2m(2￿ + n + 1)
:
Therefore, the resulting output price ￿￿(m;n) in the downstream market obtains
as
￿￿(m;n) = 1 ￿
n(2m ￿ 1)
2m(2￿ + n + 1)
:
The pro￿t ￿i(m;n) of a downstream ￿rm at equilibrium in the corresponding




(4m￿ + 4m + n ￿ 1)
2m ￿ 1
m2 (2￿ + n + 1)
2:
Notice that ￿i > 0; - a requirement needed to guarantee the survival of ￿rms
in the downstream market.
3.1.1 Comparative statics




when the number of upstream ￿rms increases, the output price decreases. This
re￿ ects the fact that an increase in the number of upstream ￿rms leads to a
decrease in the equilibrium input price which, in turn, induces downstream
￿rms to produce more at equilibrium.
Furthermore, it can be checked:
Proposition 1 The pro￿t ￿i(m;n) of a downstream ￿rm when n ￿ 3 always
increases with the number of upstream ￿rms. On the contrary, when n > 3; the
pro￿t of a downstream ￿rm decreases as the number of upstream ￿rms increases,






An increase in the number of upstream ￿rms in￿ uences both the revenue
and the cost sides of the pro￿t of a downstream one. On the one hand, it
decreases the output selling price; on the other, it decreases the unit cost of
1The derivative of the pro￿t of a downstream ￿rm is
3m+n￿mn￿1+2m￿
4(n+1)2m3 : Hence, the sign
depends only on the sign of the numerator. The derivative is positive i⁄ ￿ > mn+1￿3m￿n
2m ;
which is satis￿ed when n < 3 or 3 < n and m ￿ n￿1
n￿3:
2Notice that condition (6) becomes redundant when the number of downstream ￿rms n
exceeds 5 !
7production which is equal to p
1
2: But the unit cost p
1
2 is a function of m as
well as of n; hence, whether the ￿rst or the second e⁄ect of an increase in
m on the downstream ￿rms￿pro￿t prevails, also depends on n, as clari￿ed by
Proposition 1. Intuitively, one would expect that the downstream ￿rms should
always bene￿t from an increase in competition in the upstream market since it
is expected to lower the price of the input they use. Nonetheless, this intuition
only holds when the downstream market is strongly concentrated (n ￿ 2); while
it does not whenever the degree of competition gets higher in the downstream
market! Of course, this paradoxical outcome is related to our speci￿c decreasing
returns technology. But even so, it should attract the interest of scholars on the
type of interaction existing between technology and the degree of competition
in the market.
In order to evaluate how the downstream ￿rms￿pro￿ts vary when both m







It is easily checked that
@￿i(m;n)
@n < 0: Therefore, whenever n > 5 according
to proposition 1, a proportional increase in n and m causes a decrease in the
pro￿t of a downstream ￿rm. In the remaining cases when
@￿i(m;n)
@m > 0, the sign
of the total derivative can be positive or negative.
Similarly, we get that
@￿j(m;n)
@n > 0, re￿ ecting the fact that an increase in n
generates an increase in input demand and, accordingly, an increase in the input





@m , we observe again that the sign of
the total derivative depends on m and n. Whenever m > 1; the total derivative
can have both signs depending on n.
3.1.2 Asymptotic properties of input and output prices
It is interesting to examine the e⁄ects of entry on equilibria in the successive
markets. We choose to model entry by replicating k￿times the basic economy,
as in Debreu and Scarf (1963). In the k￿th replica, there are kn downstream



















8Proposition 2 Under decreasing returns, when both the number of upstream
and downstream ￿rms tend simultaneously to in￿nity, the equilibrium input price
does not converge to upstream ￿rms￿marginal cost, but exceeds it by an amount
which decreases with the ratio of the number of ￿rms n
m: However, the equilib-
rium output price converges to the competitive output price.
The usual practice when increasing the number of ￿rms in the market con-
sists in comparing the resulting price with a ￿xed marginal cost. The novelty
here is that the marginal cost of the downstream ￿rms does not remain ￿xed
when increasing the number of ￿rms in the downstream and upstream mar-
kets simultaneously. Importantly, notice that, whatever k, the marginal cost of




m. This looks as a surprise since this context, for large values of
k; corresponds exactly to perfect competition. It is as if the downstream ￿rms
would be charged a constant tax per unit of input over the marginal cost of
producing the input, ￿: In fact, when k is close to 1; q￿(m;n) is close to zero,
implying an in￿nitesimal individual demand of input from each downstream
￿rm and, accordingly, a marginal product of the input which tends to in￿nity
with k: In particular, if the price of input were set at the marginal cost ￿; the
quantity of input demanded by the downstream ￿rms would exceed the quan-
tity which would be o⁄ered by the upstream ￿rms at the same price, preventing
thereby the equality of supply and demand, as required by the de￿nition of a
competitive equilibrium 3: Notice however that, even though upstream ￿rms get
the amount of the tax, it does not prevent the quantity of input exchanged in
the input market to correspond exactly to the quantity required to produce an
aggregate output corresponding to the competitive equilibrium output. More
than that: the burden of this tax is even required in order to induce downstream
￿rms to reduce their input demand in order to produce exactly the competitive
equilibrium output level! Notice also that the presence of this subsidy does not
bring any extra pro￿ts to the upstream ￿rms themselves: their pro￿t tends to
zero when k tends to in￿nity. Consequently, this limit value of the input price,
including the existence of the subsidy, does not preclude the limit economy to
be in a Pareto optimal state simultaneously in both markets. The existence
3The total quantity demanded by the downstream ￿rms at the downstream Cournot equi-
librium if p = ￿ obtains from the solution of the problem
Max
qi
(1 ￿ qi ￿ ￿k6=iqk)qi ￿ ￿q2
i
from which we easily obtain:
nz￿ =
n2
(n + 2￿ + 2)2 :
Thus lim
k!1
fknz￿g = 1: On the other hand, the amount of input o⁄ered by the upstream
￿rms at price ￿ is n
2( 1
2+￿+ 1
2)2 : This amount tends to zero when km and kn tend to inifnity,
and not to 1
9of this transfer, through the input price from the downstream to the upstream
￿rms, reveals the interlinkage between the competitive and technological e⁄ects
resulting from the simultaneous increase in the number of ￿rms in both mar-
kets. Furthermore, notice that, if the economy would be replicated at a di⁄erent
speed in the downstream and upstream markets, this discrepancy between mar-
ginal cost and input price may disappear. In fact, when the upstream market
is replicated in￿nitely faster than the downstream one, this discrepancy disap-
pears at the limit. For instance, when the downstream market is replicated at
speed k, while the upstream market is replicated at speed k2, the limit input
price is equal to the marginal cost ￿. In other words, the power of upstream
￿rms should be diluted much faster than the downstream ￿rms￿one in order to
force the competitive outcome !











Proposition 3 When the number of upstream ￿rms tends to in￿nity while the
number of downstream remains ￿xed,
(i) the equilibrium input price converges to upstream ￿rms￿marginal cost;
(ii) the equilibrium output price converges to the output price
1+2￿
1+n+2￿ cor-
responding to the Cournot equilibrium with n downstream ￿rms producing the
good at a unit cost ￿.
Thus, di⁄erently from proposition 2, proposition 3 ￿ts with the standard
asymptotic results obtained in the usual Cournot framework of a single market.
In fact, the technological e⁄ects, present when n and m tend simultaneously
to in￿nity, disappear when n is ￿xed: the production level of each downstream
￿rm does not tend to zero, so that, whatever m; the marginal product of the
input remains bounded away from in￿nity. Then no tax is needed to dampen the
incentive to overproduce the output. On the contrary, the competitive e⁄ects
are still operating since the input price now tends to the marginal cost.











Proposition 4 When the number of downstream ￿rms n tends to in￿nity while
the number m of upstream ones remains ￿xed, the output price converges to the
marginal cost of producing the output when m ￿rms are operating in the input
market. In this case, the input price gets arbitrary large.
10This immediately follows from the fact that the marginal cost of producing
the output at the equilibrium in the downstream market when m ￿rms operate
in the upstream market is equal to 2pq; with p = p￿(m;n) and q = q￿(m;n):
The output price exactly re￿ ects the market power existing in the upstream
market, which is transferred in the downstream market through its dependence
on the number of upstream ￿rms, m: This sheds some further light on the
interaction between two technology-linked markets under Cournot competition.
Even if the competitive conditions are met in the downstream market, since
MC ￿ = ￿￿(m;n); the output price encompasses the non competitiveness in the
input market. The usual analysis of Cournot competition in a market does
not allow this type of consideration because the relationship of costs to market
power in the input market cannot be taken into account when the cost function
is exogenous.
In fact, as in the case of pure competition considered above, when n is close to
1; q￿(m;n) is again close to zero, implying an in￿nitesimal individual demand
of input from each downstream ￿rm and, accordingly, a marginal product of
the input which tends to in￿nity with m and n: This leads downstream ￿rms￿
demand to increase beyond any limit, forcing in turn the input price to increase
itself beyond any limit when the number of upstream ￿rms remains ￿xed.
3.2 Constant returns
We consider exactly the same case as above, with the exception that the tech-
nology f(z) shared by the downstream ￿rms is now given by
f(z) = ￿z; ￿ > 0
as in Salinger and Gaudet and Van Long (with ￿ equal to 1 in the latter case).We
assume that ￿ ￿ ￿: this assumption guarantees that the marginal cost of pro-
ducing the input does not exceed its marginal product in the production of
output. The pro￿ts ￿i(qi;q￿i) of the ith downstream ￿rm at the vector of
strategies (qi;q￿i) now obtains as
￿i(qi;q￿i) = (1 ￿ qi ￿ ￿k6=iqk)qi ￿ pzi:
As a result of the strategic choice qi; each ￿rm i sends an input quantity signal
zi(p) =
qi
￿ to the upstream market. Given the price p in the input market, the
best reply of downstream ￿rm i in the upstream game obtains as
zi(z￿i;p) =
￿ ￿ p ￿ ￿2￿k6=izk
2￿2 ;i = 1;:::;n: (7)
We may compute the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the above game contingent
on the price p: De￿ning zi = z for i = 1:::n; re-expressing equation (7) and
solving it in z; we get at the symmetric solution
z￿(p) =
￿ ￿ p






Given a n-tuple (s1;:::;sj;::sm) of input strategies chosen by the upstream ￿rms
in the second stage game, the input price clearing the upstream market must
satisfy
n(￿ ￿ p)
(n + 1)￿2 = ￿m
k=1sk
so that, for this example, we get
p(￿m




Substituting (10) into the payo⁄ function ￿j(sj;s￿j) we have
￿j(sj;s￿j) =
￿













; j = 1;:::;m:
Accordingly, at the symmetric equilibrium of the second stage game, we obtain
s￿(m;n) =
n(￿ ￿ ￿)
￿2(n + 1)(m + 1)
:





Consequently, substituting this equilibrium price into the equilibrium quantities
z￿
i of input bought by each downstream ￿rm, as given by (8), we get
z￿(m;n) =
m(￿ ￿ ￿)






￿(n + 1)(m + 1)
:
Accordingly, the resulting output price ￿￿(m;n) in the downstream market ob-
tains as4
￿￿(m;n) =
￿(1 + m + n) + mn￿
￿(n + 1)(m + 1)
4Notice that, in order to have ￿￿(m;n) ￿ p￿(m;n); - the requirement needed to guarantee
the survival of ￿rms in the downstream market -, no condition on ￿ is required.
123.2.1 Comparative statics
Taking the ￿rst derivative of the input and output prices and taking into account







under constant returns, an increase in the number of upstream ￿rms leads to
a decrease in the equilibrium input price which, in turn, induces downstream
￿rms to produce more at equilibrium only if the marginal cost of producing the
input is lower than the marginal productivity of the input at the downstream
level.
The pro￿t ￿i(m;n) of a downstream ￿rm at equilibrium in the downstream
game writes as
￿i(m;n) =
m2 (￿ ￿ ￿)
2
￿2 (n + 1)
2 (m + 1)
2:
It is easily seen that
@￿i(m;n)
@m > 0; consequently, in spite of the decrease in
the output price stemmed from an increase in m, the pro￿t of a downstream
￿rm increases with m. In order to evaluate how the downstream ￿rms￿pro￿ts
vary when both m and n are increased in the same proportion, we calculate the













￿2 (n + 1)
3 (m + 1)
3 :
We see that the sign of the total derivative depends on the number of down-
stream and upstream ￿rms. Whenever 1+n
1+m > m is satis￿ed, then a proportional
increase in n and m causes an increase in the pro￿t of a downstream ￿rm.








@n > 0, re￿ ecting the fact that an increase in n generates an increase







m + 1 ￿ 2n2 ￿ 2n
￿2 (n + 1)
2 (m + 1)
3:
We observe again that the sign of the total derivative depends on m and n.
Whenever 1+n
1+m < 1
2n is satis￿ed, then a proportional increase in n and m causes




1+m > m are not compatible, the pro￿t of an upstream ￿rm should always
decrease when the pro￿t of a downstream ￿rm increases, and vice versa, as m
and n increase in the same proportion.
133.2.2 Asymptotic properties of input and output prices












Proposition 5 Under constant returns, when both n and m tend to in￿nity,
the equilibrium output price converges to its marginal cost, and similarly for the
input price. Furthermore both prices converge to their competitive counterpart.













Proposition 6 Under upstream competition and downstream oligopoly,
(i) the equilibrium input price converges to the competitive price;
(ii) the equilibrium output price converges to the output price corresponding
to the Cournot equilibrium with n downstream ￿rms producing the good at cost
￿.














Proposition 7 Under downstream competition and upstream oligopoly, the out-
put price converges to the marginal cost of production when m ￿rms are operating
in the input market.
14Proof. The increase in cost following the production of a further unit of output
is equal to
p
￿; with p denoting the input price. We have seen in (7) that the input
price when m upstream ￿rms operate in the input market is equal to
￿+m￿
1+m :
To summarize, while the output price converges to
￿+n￿
￿(1+n) under upstream
pure competition, it tends to
￿+m￿
￿(1+m) when downstream pure competition is the
case ! Consequently, the degree of market power existing in the upstream (resp.
downstream) market determines the discrepancy between the output competi-
tive price and the actual output price.
Let us provide a brief summary of our ￿ndings concerning entry. This sum-
mary highlights the crucial role played by the degree of competition in the input
market both on the demand and supply sides of the downstream market, as well
as the importance of the technology used by downstream ￿rms. (i) Entry in
the upstream game generates lower prices for consumers in the downstream
market, regardless of the type of technology used at the downstream level; (ii)
entry in the upstream game always increases downstream ￿rms￿pro￿ts under
constant returns; on the contrary, under decreasing returns, pro￿ts are higher
under monopoly and duopoly while they are lower for oligopolies with a larger
number of downstream ￿rms; (iii) simultaneous entry in both markets, -i.e.
higher m and n -; entails di⁄erent e⁄ects on pro￿ts of upstream and down-
stream ￿rms depending on the type of technology. Under constant returns, the
sign of pro￿ts￿variation depends on the ratio n
m; under decreasing returns, the
sign of pro￿ts￿variations only depends on the number of downstream ￿rms, n;
(iv) whatever the type of technology, the output price opposed to consumers is
not equal to the marginal cost of producing the output, even when the num-
ber of downstream ￿rms is in￿nitely large, unless the upstream market is itself
competitive; (v) the input price at equilibrium always exceeds the marginal cost
of producing the input and tends to in￿nity when the number of downstream
￿rms becomes arbitrarily large.
All these results cannot be directly derived in a framework which does not
take explicitly into account (i) the interlinkage between the downstream and
upstream markets through the technology used by the output producers, and
(ii) the degree of competition in each of these markets.
4 Exploring industry equilibria: collusion
4.1 Modelling collusion
For the sake of analyzing collusion in technology-linked markets, we restrict
ourselves to constant returns technology. Assume that k downstream ￿rms i,
i = 1;:::;k; say; and h upstream ￿rms j;j = 1;:::;h; say, integrate vertically and
maximize joint pro￿ts. We assume that k < n and h < m5: After this merger,
5This assumption guarantees that there always exists at least one unintegrated ￿rm on
each side of the upstream market so that the integrated entity cannot exclude the uintegrated
15we move from an initial situation comprising globally n+m ￿rms to a new one,
with n￿k+1 ￿rms in the downstream market and m￿h in the upstream one6.
Indeed, the integrated entity now internalizes output production by using the
input provided by the h upstream ￿rms belonging to the new entity. This general
formulation covers as particular cases mergers including either only downstream
￿rms, or only upstream ones, which correspond to the usual case of horizontal
merging of ￿rms.
Let us ￿rst consider the game played among the n￿k+1 ￿rms operating in
the downstream market after collusion takes place7. The payo⁄of the integrated
￿rm I is given by






As for the downstream ￿rms i;i 6= I; not belonging to the integrated entity,
they have as payo⁄s







It is clear from the above payo⁄s that the main di⁄erence between the collusive
and non collusive members in the downstream market comes from the fact that
the former pay their input at marginal cost ￿ while the latter buy it at the input
price p: Since ￿I is concave, we may use the ￿rst order condition to get the best









As for the downstream ￿rms i; i 6= I; their best reply in the downstream market












Assuming a symmetric equilibrium between the unintegrated ￿rms, we get
the resulting Cournot equilibrium in the downstream market, namely
q￿
I(k;h) =
￿ ￿ ￿ + (n ￿ k)(p ￿ ￿)
￿(n ￿ k + 2)
downstream ￿rms to have access to the input. A similar asssumption in another approach to
collusion has been used by Gabszewicz and Hansen (1971).
6Di⁄erently from Gaudet and Van Long (1996) who consider only pairwise mergers consist-
ing of a single downstream and upstream ￿rms, we allow for collusive agreements embodying
an arbitrary number of them.
7Notice that, as in Salinger (1988), we assume complete foreclosure: the entity does not
sell input to the unintegrated downstream ￿rms.




￿ ￿ 2p + ￿
￿(n ￿ k + 2)
: (13)
Consequently, as expected, the downstream equilibrium is conditional on the
input price obtained in the upstream market as a result of supply and demand





￿(n￿k+2)): As for the supply, it comes from the strategies sj; j 6= I;
selected by the unintegrated upstream ￿rms in this market. Consider the jth
upstream ￿rm which does not belong to the entity. Its pro￿t ￿j at the vector
of strategies (sj;s￿j) writes as
￿j(sj;s￿j) = p(sj;s￿j)sj ￿ ￿sj;











Accordingly, the payo⁄ of the j-th upstream ￿rm writes as
￿j(sj;s￿j) =






Therefore , at the symmetric equilibrium in the upstream market, each uninte-
grated ￿rm supplies a quantity s￿
jof input which obtain as
s￿
j(k;h) =
(￿ ￿ ￿)(n ￿ k)
￿(n ￿ k + 2)(m ￿ h + 1)
Substituting the expression of s￿
j in (14) we get the equilibrium input price
p￿(k;h) =
￿ + ￿ + 2￿(m ￿ h)
2(m ￿ h + 1)
(15)




(m ￿ h)(￿ ￿ ￿)





(￿ ￿ ￿)(n ￿ k + 2(m ￿ h + 1))
2￿(n ￿ k + 2)(m ￿ h + 1)
:
Hence, the resulting output price ￿￿is given by
￿￿(k;h) =
(2(m ￿ h) + n ￿ k + 2)(￿ + ￿) + 2￿(n ￿ k)(m ￿ h)
2￿(n ￿ k + 2)(m ￿ h + 1)
:
17For later use, we also compute the pro￿t ￿I(k;h) of the integrated ￿rm
￿I(k;h) =
(￿ ￿ ￿)
2 (2(m ￿ h) + n ￿ k + 2)2
4￿2 (n ￿ k + 2)
2 (m ￿ h + 1)
2 ; (16)
and the pro￿t ￿i(k;h) of an unintegrated downstream ￿rm, namely
￿i(k;h) =
(￿ ￿ ￿)
2 (m ￿ h)
2
￿2(n ￿ k + 2)2(m ￿ h + 1)2: (17)
It is interesting to compare the input and output prices with and without collu-
sive agreements. It is easy to show that the input price in the ￿rst case is lower
than in the latter if, and only if, the number h of collusive upstream ￿rms is
smaller than half of the total number of upstream ￿rms. Hence the price of the
input is lower when the merger takes place, even though the number of ￿rms
supplying the input in the upstream market is smaller. Therefore, a collusive
agreement involving a number of upstream ￿rms smaller than half the total
number does not bring a rise in the downstream rivals￿costs ￿ la Salop and
Sche⁄man (1983, 1987). Nevertheless, it is easy to check that the output price
is always smaller when no mergers take place, whatever the number of upstream
￿rms inside the entity.
4.2 Horizontal mergers: Salant, Schwitzer and Reynolds
revisited
In their 1983 paper, Salant, Schwitzer and Reynold (SSR) point out a bizarre re-
sult of horizontal mergers when ￿rms play Cournot and produce a homogeneous
good: "some exogenous mergers may reduce the endogenous joint pro￿ts of the
￿rms that are assumed to collude. In the Cournot case this is surprising since
the merged ￿rm always has the option of producing exactly as its components
did in the pre-merger equilibrium".
The model of SSR considers only one market where the good is traded and
produced at a constant exogenous marginal cost. In this market, the conse-
quences of mergers are determined by the strategic interaction of collusive ￿rms
and outsiders. Namely, the collusive ￿rms internalize inframarginal losses be-
tween them; so, as a merged entity, they decrease their ￿nal output while the
non colluding ￿rms expand theirs. There exist then the possibility that the
increase of production of outsiders may decrease the pro￿t of collusive ￿rms
making it even smaller than the pro￿t each (collusive) ￿rm can get producing
independently. SSR ￿nd also that (i) when the pro￿t per ￿rm in the entity is
lower than the pro￿t obtained without merger, higher the number of ￿rms in the
collusive entity, higher the loss from the merger; (ii) the merger that completely
monopolizes the market is always pro￿table per ￿rm, compared with the sum
of per ￿rm pro￿ts with no merger at all.
Do the same conclusions remain valid when we consider explicitely technology-
linked markets? Indeed, pro￿ts or losses from horizontal mergers in the down-
stream market may well behave quite di⁄erently when making explicit the inter-
18action with the upstream ￿rms, even when none upstream ￿rm is participating
to the merger. We denote by g(k;h) the increase in pro￿t of a downstream ￿rm
that results if k and h ￿rm collude, respectively in the downstream and up-
stream markets. Then, using equations (16) and (17) that refer to the constant
returns technology (the one also used by SSR), we obtain
g(k;h) =
(2(m ￿ h) + n ￿ k + 2)2 ￿ 4(m ￿ h)
2 (h + k)
4(n ￿ k + 2)
2 (m ￿ h + 1)
2 (h + k)
:












0 ? if m < n:
Thus, contrary to SSR, the presence of the upstream linkage may generate
situations in which losses do not appear at all. Take for instance, an industry
composed of 6 downstream ￿rms and 6 upstream ones. It can easily be checked
that, if h = 0; g(k;h) > 0 for every k: In turns out that now the existence of
losses due to mergers depends on the number of upstream ￿rms m in the economy
compared with the number of downstream ￿rms n: Furthermore, when the pro￿t
per ￿rm in the entity is lower than the pro￿t obtained without merger, the
property that the higher the number of ￿rms in the collusive entity, the higher
the loss from the merger only holds when m ￿ n: In the opposite case, a higher
number in the collusive entity may well entail a smaller loss from the merger.
On the other hand, the property that a merger, which would completely
monopolize the market is always pro￿table per ￿rm, compared with the sum of
per ￿rm pro￿ts with no merger at all, no longer holds when the upstream linkage
is taken into account.Consider for example a industry with m = 1 and n = 6.
It can be checked that any horizontal merger up to 5 downstream ￿rms gives
pro￿ts. The only merger that gives losses to collusive ￿rms is the total merger of
the downstream ￿rms. Thus, in this example, the only merger producing losses
is the merger that SSR claim to give always pro￿ts- the monopoly merger.
Finally, di⁄erently from SSR, g(k;0) is not convex. Hence, if a merger of k
￿rms causes losses, a merger of k+1 ￿rm may generates pro￿ts. For example, in
a industry of 12 ￿rms producing the output and 12 ￿rms producing the input,
a merger of 6 downstream ￿rms causes gains but not a merger of 7 downstream
￿rms.
To conclude, introducing the upstream linkage considerably modi￿es the
e⁄ects of horizontal merging as analyzed by Salant, Schwitzer and Reynolds.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have tried to clarify how entry and collusion a⁄ect succes-
sive markets when the technology linking these markets is made explicit. We
19have di⁄erentiated the e⁄ects of entry in these markets according to the nature
of the technology : constant and decreasing returns, making explicit several
properties which di⁄er in both cases. Moreover, we have highlighted the role of
upstream linkage on the pro￿tability of horizontal mergers ￿ la Salant, Switzer
and Reynolds.
Our exploration of industry equilibria deserves to be continued. First, as in
the existing literature, we have kept the assumption of price taking agents in the
demand side of the markets. This assumption is not very satisfactory because it
is di¢ cult to justify the fact that an economic agent behaves strategically in one
market but not in another. A full treatment would require downstream ￿rms
behaving strategically simultaneously in the downstream and upstream markets.
This constitutes our next point on our research agenda. In particular, it would
be interesting to examine whether the e⁄ects of entry which are speci￿c to each
type of technology would still be observed with more sophisticated downstream
￿rms, behaving strategically in both markets. Also, even if welfare implications
of entry and collusion can be derived from our framework, they were not our
main concern in this paper. This does not mean that they should not deserve
more attention in future work. Another avenue for potential research would
consist in analysing the stability of collusive agreements, as in d￿ Aspremont
et al.(1983), using the framework identi￿ed in the present paper. Finally, as
claimed above at the end of the presentation of the model, the analysis could be
extended to chains of technology-linked markets and to technological contexts
involving more than one factor. All this looks like a promising research territory
for a better understanding of industry equilibria in technology linked markets.
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